


































































cognition	thesis,	he	is	now	in	the	Moorean	predicament	of	believing	that	MoMA	is	on	53rd	St,	while	believing	that	he	doesn’t	believe	this.	So	the	extended	cognition	thesis	predicts	that	Otto	is	irrational.	But	it’s	implausible	to	suppose	that	Otto	is	irrational	just	by	virtue	of	misperceiving	his	notebook.	Compare	Stewart	Cohen’s	(1984)	new	evil	demon	problem	for	reliabilism:	a	victim	of	a	Cartesian	evil	demon	can	be	fully	rational	even	if	their	perceptual	experiences	systematically	misrepresent	the	environment.	Similarly,	Otto	can	be	fully	rational	even	if	his	perceptual	experiences	occasionally	misrepresent	the	contents	of	his	notebook.	In	general,	perceptual	error	is	not	sufficient	for	rational	error.	In	summary,	a	proponent	of	the	extended	cognition	thesis	cannot	respect	both	of	the	following	plausible	principles	about	rationality:		 (1) Pryor’s	principle:	if	you’re	rational,	and	it	perceptually	seems	to	you	that	p,	and	there	are	no	defeaters,	then	you	believe	that	p.	(Pryor	2000:	532)	(2) Shoemaker’s	principle:	if	you’re	rational,	and	you	believe	that	p,	and	you	consider	whether	you	believe	that	p,	then	you	believe	that	you	believe	that	p.	(Shoemaker	1996:	83,	241-2)		These	principles	conflict	in	the	case	that	Otto	misperceives	his	notebook	as	saying	that	MoMA	is	on	51st	St.	According	to	Pryor’s	principle,	it’s	rational	for	Otto	to	believe	that	his	notebook	says	MoMA	is	on	51st	St,	rather	than	53rd	St.	If	he’s	rational,	then	Otto	can	use	Evans’	procedure	in	coming	to	rationally	believe	that	he	believes	that	MoMA	is	on	51st	St,	rather	than	53rd	St.	And	yet,	by	hypothesis,	he	believes	that	MoMA	is	on	53rd	St.	According	to	Shoemaker’s	principle,	it’s	not	rational	for	Otto	to	believe	that	MoMA	is	on	53rd	St	while	believing	that	he	does	not	believe	this.	So	the	two	principles	come	into	conflict.	A	proponent	of	the	extended	cognition	thesis	might	argue	for	epistemic	parity	between	Inga	and	Otto	by	appealing	to	a	perceptual	model	of	introspection.	On	a	perceptual	model	of	introspection,	there	is	no	relevant	epistemological	disparity	between	Inga’s	introspective	access	to	her	memory	and	Otto’s	perceptual	access	to	his	notebook.	However,	the	perceptual	model	of	introspection	should	be	
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7. The	Argument	from	Disparity	In	sections	1	and	2,	we	saw	that	there	are	plausible	arguments	for	the	extended	cognition	thesis	and	for	accessibilism.	In	section	3,	however,	we	saw	an	argument	that	these	two	positions	are	incompatible,	and	I	defended	the	premises	of	this	argument	in	sections	4-6.	If	the	argument	for	incompatibilism	is	sound,	then	we	cannot	accept	both	accessibilism	and	the	extended	cognition	thesis.	Since	I	am	persuaded	by	the	Moorean	argument	for	accessibilism,	I	am	thereby	committed	to	rejecting	the	extended	cognition	thesis.	The	aim	of	this	section	is	to	discharge	the	burden	of	explaining	where	the	argument	from	parity	goes	wrong.	I	claim	that	the	third	premise	of	the	parity	argument	is	false.	This	premise	states	that	the	information	stored	in	Otto’s	notebook	plays	the	same	role	as	the	information	stored	in	Inga’s	memory.	But	in	fact	there	is	a	crucial	disparity	between	Inga	and	Otto	–	namely,	that	Inga	has	access	to	the	information	stored	in	her	memory	though	introspection,	whereas	Otto	has	access	to	the	information	stored	in	his	notebook	through	perception.	Moreover,	this	is	not	a	merely	superficial	difference.	On	the	contrary,	it	is	deep	enough	to	ground	a	cognitive	difference	between	Inga	and	Otto.	I’ve	argued	that	the	functional	role	of	belief	includes	its	role	in	justifying	other	beliefs.	And	I’ve	argued	that	if	access	internalism	is	true,	then	beliefs	can	play	this	justifying	role	only	if	they	are	accessible	through	introspection.	Since	the	information	stored	in	Inga’s	memory	is	accessible	through	introspection,	it	can	play	the	justifying	role	that	is	required	for	belief.	In	contrast,	the	information	stored	in	Otto’s	notebook	is	accessible	through	perception,	rather	than	introspection,	so	it	cannot	play	the	justifying	role	required	for	constituting	belief.	The	upshot	is	that	we	can	give	an	argument	from	disparity	for	the	conclusion	that	Otto’s	notebook,	unlike	Inga’s	memory,	does	not	constitute	beliefs:		 (1) Everything	that	plays	a	justifying	role	is	accessible	through	introspection.	(2) All	beliefs	play	a	justifying	role.	(3) The	information	in	Otto’s	notebook	is	not	accessible	though	introspection.	(4) Therefore,	Otto	does	not	believe	the	information	in	his	notebook.	
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	As	we	have	seen,	proponents	of	access	externalism	reject	premise	(1),	while	proponents	of	strong	phenomenal	mentalism	reject	premise	(2),	and	proponents	of	extended	introspection	reject	premise	(3).	But	having	defended	all	three	premises	against	objections,	I	conclude	that	we	should	accept	the	conclusion	(4).	The	parity	argument	fails,	and	the	disparity	argument	succeeds,	because	extended	states	do	not	satisfy	the	parity	principle.	According	to	the	parity	principle,	anything	that	plays	the	same	role	as	belief	is	itself	a	belief.	This	principle	is	motivated	by	a	broadly	functionalist	conception	of	the	mind	on	which	belief	is	realized	by	information	that	plays	the	right	kind	of	role	in	the	subject’s	psychology.	But	what	exactly	counts	as	the	right	kind	of	role?	Different	versions	of	functionalism	give	different	answers	to	this	question.	Clark	and	Chalmers	emphasize	the	causal-explanatory	role	of	belief.	They	argue	that	extended	states	can	function	much	like	beliefs	in	the	causal	explanation	of	behavior.	On	this	basis,	they	conclude	that	extended	states	are	beliefs.	But	their	argument	assumes	that	the	role	of	belief	is	exhausted	by	its	causal-explanatory	role.	Here	is	a	representative	passage	from	a	recent	discussion	by	Chalmers:		 The	deeper	point	is	that	extended	states	can	function	in	explanation	in	very	much	the	same	way	that	beliefs	function,	and	should	be	regarded	as	sharing	a	deep	and	important	explanatory	kind	with	them.	This	explanatory	unification	is	the	real	underlying	point	of	the	extended	mind	thesis.	(Chalmers	2011:	xiv)		A	key	point	that	goes	missing	in	Clark	and	Chalmers’s	discussion	is	that	the	functional	role	of	belief	is	not	exhausted	by	its	causal	role	in	explaining	behavior,	but	also	includes	its	epistemic	role	in	justifying	other	beliefs.	Given	access	internalism,	beliefs	must	be	accessible	through	introspection	in	order	to	play	this	justifying	role.	But	since	Otto’s	extended	states	are	not	accessible	through	introspection,	they	cannot	play	a	justifying	role.	Therefore,	Otto’s	extended	states	should	not	be	counted	as	beliefs,	even	if	they	play	an	explanatory	role	that	is	otherwise	similar	to	the	explanatory	role	of	belief.	
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The	more	general	moral	is	that	commonsense	functionalism	about	belief	is	best	construed	as	normative	functionalism,	rather	than	merely	causal	functionalism.	In	other	words,	belief	should	be	defined	in	terms	of	normative	as	well	as	merely	causal	aspects	of	its	functional	role.	After	all,	commonsense	psychology	is	not	a	purely	causal	theory.	It	is	also	a	normative	theory	of	what	justifies	what.	This	is	one	way	in	which	our	commonsense	theory	of	mind	is	different	from	other	scientific	theories.	A	functionalist	theory	of	belief	that	highlights	its	causal	role	at	the	expense	of	its	normative	role	thereby	ignores	what	is	most	distinctive	to	our	commonsense	understanding	(as	opposed	to	a	purely	scientific	understanding)	of	the	mind.	Why	have	so	many	philosophers	emphasized	the	causal	role	of	belief	at	the	expense	of	its	normative	role	in	developing	functionalist	theories	of	mind?	Much	of	the	impetus	comes	from	a	program	of	naturalistic	reduction.	Causation	is	thought	to	be	more	amenable	to	reduction	than	normativity	and	so	better	suited	to	giving	a	reductionist	definition	of	mental	states.	But	if	the	program	of	naturalistic	reduction	is	to	be	successful,	then	it	needs	to	encompass	normativity	as	well	as	causation.	So	the	program	of	naturalistic	reduction	provides	no	principled	rationale	for	defining	beliefs	and	other	mental	states	in	terms	of	purely	causal	rather	than	normative	aspects	of	their	functional	role.	I	conclude	that	the	extended	cognition	thesis	should	be	rejected	on	broadly	epistemological	grounds.	And	I	put	this	forward	as	just	one	example	of	the	way	in	which	epistemology	can	and	should	constrain	our	understanding	of	the	mind.		
8. Conclusions	In	this	chapter,	I	have	argued	that	we	should	reject	the	extended	cognition	thesis	on	epistemological	grounds.	I	close	with	some	clarifications	and	concessions.	First,	I	have	argued	that	Otto’s	extended	states	are	not	beliefs	because	they	are	not	accessible	through	introspection	and	so	they	cannot	play	an	epistemic	role	in	justifying	other	beliefs.	But	this	is	consistent	with	Clark	and	Chalmers’	claim	that	extended	states	play	a	role	in	the	causal	explanation	of	behavior	that	is	otherwise	similar	to	the	role	of	belief.	So	we	might	concede	that	extended	states	can	play	some	but	not	all	of	the	functional	roles	that	we	associate	with	our	concept	of	belief.	
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Second,	my	discussion	of	the	extended	cognition	thesis	is	exclusively	concerned	with	doxastic	states	and	processes,	as	distinct	from	the	subdoxastic	states	and	processes	that	figure	in	computational	explanations	in	cognitive	science.	My	discussion	has	no	implications	for	a	version	of	the	extended	cognition	thesis	that	concerns	subdoxastic	states	and	processes,	since	they	are	not	subject	to	epistemic	evaluation	and	they	do	not	play	an	epistemic	role	in	justifying	belief.	Finally,	I	do	not	deny	the	possibility	of	science-fiction	scenarios	in	which	beliefs	are	realized	outside	the	skull.	What	I	deny	is	that	beliefs	are	realized	outside	the	skull	just	by	playing	the	kind	of	role	that	Otto’s	notebook	plays.	Otto’s	notebook	does	not	realize	beliefs	because	its	contents	are	accessible	by	perception,	rather	than	introspection,	and	so	they	cannot	play	an	epistemic	role	in	justifying	other	beliefs.	Introspective	access	usually	coincides	with	intracranial	location,	but	the	two	can	come	apart:	in	science	fiction	scenarios,	there	can	be	introspective	access	to	extracranial	states	and	perceptual	access	to	intracranial	states.	To	that	extent,	I	am	in	full	agreement	with	Clark	and	Chalmers	that	“when	it	comes	to	belief,	there	is	nothing	sacred	about	skull	and	skin”	(1998:	14).		
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